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when applied to a civil case involving an average conviction of one
of the parties of a traffic violation. It is common knowledge that
such a conviction usually represents a conclusion reached in a mere
summary proceeding, in which speed of trial outweighs thorough
consideration. In addition, the accused rarely makes a determined
defense of his innocence, since the penalty involved is relatively
minor as contrasted with the cost of litigation. Some states have
recognized this possible weakness in a traffic violation conviction and
have expressly excluded them by statute.1 5 A major action for damages
involving the same facts is in a separate category as regards thoroughness of presentation of evidence and care in weighing evidentiary
facts. Nevertheless, the propriety of extending the rule of exclusion
to a prior conviction resulting from a jury verdict, which must be
based on proof beyond a reasonable doubt, is highly questionable, as
the modem trend recognizes. Admittedly the issues involved in a
criminal trial and a tort action not infrequently fail to correspond;
the fact that a party disobeys the law does not necessarily prove that
such action is the sole or even the primary cause of damages arising
in connection therewith. But in those instances in which the conclusions of fact involved in the issues of* law are the same, the
thoroughness of presentation comparable, and the requisite burden of
proof at least as heavy in the criminal as in the civil proceeding, the
adoption of the rule of exclusion not only wastes time for purely
artificial reasons but also necessarily admits that our jury system of
trial is not entirely reliable.
ROBERT E. VEmqEY

INCOME TAX: DEDUCTIBILITY OF BOND PREMIUM
PAID FOR CONVERSION OPTION
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Korell, 889 U. S. 619 (1950)
The Commissioner disallowed taxpayer's deduction for amortizable
bond premium on a taxable bond, under Section 124 of the Internal
Revenue Code, on the ground that the premium was paid for a stock
conversion option rather than for a higher interest rate. On review,
the Tax Court held this deduction proper; the Court of Appeals
15Highway Traffic Regulation Act, MniN. STAT. §169.94 (1949).
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affirmed; and the Supreme Court granted certiorari. HELD, an
amortizable bond premium is deductible from gross income even
though paid for a stock conversion privilege rather than for the
interest feature of the bond. Judgment affirmed, Justice Black
dissenting.
This decision provoked immediate action by Congress; the 1950
Revenue Act amended the Code to provide that no premium or part
thereof attributable to the conversion feature of a bond may be
included in the deduction allowed for amortizable bond premium.'
The Korel case and its sequel, the amendment, resolve a conflict that
first arose under a 1942 provision of the Internal Revenue Code
allowing a deduction from gross income of the amortized portion of
bond premium paid.2 Prior to that time no deduction had been
permitted for capital losses arising from premium payments until
these losses were ascertained upon sale, exchange, or maturity of the
bond.3
A bond bears on its face, of course, a principal amount, sometimes
termed face value, at which it is to be redeemed at maturity. It may
be, and normally is, purchased at either more or less than this principal
amount. Any excess paid is a premium; a $100 bond purchased for
$120 is bought at a premium of $20. Not infrequently the authorizing
indenture specifies that the issuer may redeem or "call" the bond prior
to maturity by paying the principal amount plus a small premium.
At times the indenture also permits the bondholder to convert his
bond into stock prior to call. The amortizable premium for income
tax purposes is that portion of the total premium paid by the bondholder that he can deduct as a charge against his ordinary income.
For example, assume a $100 bond purchased by a calendar-year taxpayer on January 1, 1945, at $120 and maturing on January 1, 1950, at
which time exactly $100 was due. In this example the amortizable
premium was the same as the premium paid upon purchase, namely,
$20, but it should have been spread ratably over the five-year period.
If this bond did not mature until January 1, 1965, but was callable
pursuant to the indenture at $105 in 1950, the premium paid was
'Pub.
L. No. 814, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. §217(a) (Sept. 23, 1950).
2
hqt. REv. CoDE §§23(v), 125.
BRevenue Act of 1938, §23(e),(f),(g), 52 STAT. 461 (1938); Old Colony
.RI. v. Commissioner, .284 U.S. 552, 556 (1932); New York Life Ins. Co. v.
Edwards, 271 U.S. 109, 116 (1926); see Commissioner v. Shoong, 117 F.2d 131,
133 (9th Cir. 1949). A similar loss deduction for bad debts resulted from TNT.
REv. CoDE §23(k) i the event that the bond became wortbless.
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still $20, but the amortizable premium was $15, again normally spread
over the five-year interval, or $3 per year. But if, on the other hand,
this bond was callable at $105 at any time at the issuer's option, regardless of its maturity date, the entire amortizable premium was deductible immediately; that is, $15 could have been deducted for the
taxable year 1945. The adjusted basis of the bond, in tax-law terminology, is the taxpayer's purchase price less any required adjustments. One of these must be made when a deduction from taxable
income is taken for amortizable premium.
It is common knowledge that a premium is often paid for a higherthan-market interest rate, the buyer expecting the interest payments
at this higher rate to cover not only a normal interest payment but
also the additional sum paid out as premium upon purchase of the
bond.4 Congress recognized this proposition and enacted a statute
allowing the deduction of the amortizable premium principally because holders of taxable bonds were being taxed on all interest received, that is, both the normal interest and the portion of capital in
effect returned through interest payments,5 while holders of taxexempt bonds escaped tax on all interest 6 and in addition were allowed,
as were others, to deduct as capital loss the excess over the principal
7
amount paid as premium.
The conflict in judicial interpretation of the 1942 amendment concefned bond premium paid for a stock conversion option, as distinct
from an interest feature. In Commissioner v. Shoong8 the Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ruled that a premium paid for an option
bought a speculation, and that interest payments in such a venture
were not expected to return the portion of capital so invested; hence
no deduction for the premium should be allowed. In the Korell case
the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that no ground
existed for denying a deduction of premium paid for the privilege of
conversion, inasmuch as the Code, as amended in 1942, failed to
differentiate between such a premium and one paid for a straight
interest feature. 9 The Supreme Court approved this decision, thereby
adhering to the precise terminology of the statute and quite properly
4

NOBLE, ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES 457 (4th ed. 1945).
Revenue Act of 1938, §22(a), 52 STAT. 457 (1938).

5

61d. at §22(b)(4).
7Id. at §23(e),(f),(g).

8177 F.2d 131 (9th Cir. 1949).
9
Commissioner v. Korell, 176 F.2d 152 (2d Cir. 1949).
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leaving policy changes to Congress. 10
The Korell decision enabled the taxpayer to include, as a charge
against his ordinary income, not only that portion of total premium
properly attributable to the interest feature but also the larger portion
attributable to the conversion privilege. This reduced the adjusted
basis of the bond. By then selling the bond after more than six months
had elapsed he would, if the original speculative value of the conversion feature had not changed in the market, realize a gain for tax
purposes; but this would be a long-term capital gain only. In other
words, having deducted the full amount of premium paid for the
conversion feature from his taxable income, he could obtain on resale
his original purchase price and yet have only fifty percent of the
premium received on the resale taken into account in computing his
taxable income. Furthermore, if he had a high income and elected to
treat the long-term capital gain as separately taxable, the tax rate on
such gain was limited to a maximum of fifty percent. Speculation by
those with a large amount of capital to invest was unwittingly invited
by the prospect of a handsome net profit in the form of tax avoidance.1"
By the 1950 amendment to the Code, Congress has effectively
stifled this technique as regards convertible bonds-2 acquired after
10 At p. 910.
11
Assume a taxpayer with ordinary income of $75,000 for the calendar year
1949. On, say, March 10, 1949, he buys $1,000,000 principal amount of taxable
$100 bonds redeemable in that year at $105. Primarily because they can be
converted into valuable stock, he buys them at $120; he pays $1,200,000, although
he of course runs the business risk that they may be called before he converts. He
can accordingly deduct $1,200,000 less $1,050,000, or $150,000, as amortizable
premium from his 1949 ordinary income. Examined from another angle, this transaction results by reason of this deduction in an adjusted basis of $1,050,000, that
is, his cost basis, or $1,200,000, minus his amortizable premium of $150,000. In
late September, after holding these bonds for a minimum of six months, he sclls
them in the same type of market for $1,200,000. As a matter of business he neither
gains nor loses by this transaction; but for tax purposes he has a long-term capital
gain of $150,000, of which only 50%, or $75,000, is taken into account in determining net income. This gain, plus his $75,000 of other income, gives him a
total 1949 income of $150,000. Against this he can charge the $150,000 deducted
as amortizable bond premium. As a result he Piays no tax at all, although enjoying,
as a business matter, an ordinary income of $75,000 in 1949. This maneuver is
eliminated by the 1950 amendment to the extent of the important conversion
feature, which is a primary cause for offering a high premium upon purchase.
2
1 The term "convertible bond" includes a bond issued with detachable stockpurchase warrants. See Szi.. REP. No. 2375, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 47 (1950);
U.S. CODE CONG. SEnv.

2672 (1950).
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